Extensive research effort has been devoted to understanding the labor supply effects of social insurance programs, especially in light of the historical decline in male labor force participation. In particular, the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program has attracted the attention of policymakers and researchers alike, as it has grown dramatically since inception, and features a particularly strong work disincentive: an implicit 100,000 percent marginal tax rate on the first $1 of earnings above a threshold representing Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA), set at $1,000/month in 2010. Indeed, the decline in male labor force participation has been attributed at least in part to DI (Bound and Waidmann 1992; 2002; Autor and Duggan, 2003) . Over the last two decades, the DI caseload has shifted from one characterized by individuals with circulatory, neoplasms and infectious diseases to one dominated by individuals with mental and musculoskeletal impairments. Nevertheless, the causal effect of DI on labor supply is difficult to estimate since all U.S. workers face the same benefit schedule. As a result, observed variation in benefits is due mainly to past earnings, which may be correlated with unobserved health status or tastes for work. Lacking either exogenous variation in program generosity or a means of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, only a small group of studies have succeeded in obtaining credible estimates of the effect of DI on labor supply (e.g., Bound 1989, Bound and Waidmann 1992; Gruber and Kubik 1997; Gruber 2000; Autor and Duggan 2003; Chen and van der Klaauw 2008; Maestas and Yin 2008; French and Song, This compositional shift has renewed interest in the work disincentives associated with the DI program and has increased the possibility that some form of work might be possible for some DI recipients. 2010; and Maestas, Mullen and Strand 2010) , and even these have come to different conclusions about the magnitude of the work disincentive effects of DI. Maestas and Yin (2008) proposed a new source of identification that rests on a little-studied interaction between DI and the Social Security retirement program, and a recent policy change that changed the nature of the program interaction. Specifically, DI benefits are payable to eligible individuals until they reach their Full Retirement Age (FRA), at which point DI benefits automatically convert to retired worker benefits under the Social Security Old-Age (OA) program. While the terms governing the benefit amount change, the benefit amount itself remains unchanged. Thus, since they are no longer subject to the strict DI work rules, the implicit tax on earnings is abruptly relaxed at exactly the FRA. Moreover, the extent to which the implicit tax is relaxed has varied over time owing to the year 2000 elimination of the Social Security earnings test after the FRA. Prior to 2000, DI participants attaining full retirement age faced a reduction in the implicit marginal tax rate from approximately 100,000 percent to 33 percent (on an even higher exempt amount), the implicit tax rate imposed by the OA earnings test at the FRA.
In 2000, the earnings test at the full retirement age was eliminated, and thus DI participants reaching their FRA in 2000 or later experienced complete elimination of the implicit tax at full retirement age. If the work disincentive is binding on DI participants, then we would expect to observe an increase in labor supply at the FRA.
Using a panel of DI beneficiaries in the Health and Retirement Study, Maestas and Yin (2008) found a 1.6 percentage point increase in labor force participation after conversion to the OA program at the FRA, on a base employment rate of 4.5 percent at ages 63-64. In sharp contrast, employment in the general population declines by 9.3 percentage points, on a base of 45 percent at ages 63-64. Using a difference-in-difference estimator adjusted for differentially time-varying covariates such as health status and health insurance coverage, the implied disincentive effect of the DI program is a 10.4 percentage point reduction in labor force participation. In addition to an extensive margin effect, Maestas and Yin (2008) also found significant disincentive effects on intensive margin measures, namely hours worked, weeks worked, and annual earnings.
In this paper, we analyze the natural experiment generated by the DI-OA program interaction at FRA in administrative Social Security data for the universe of primary worker DI beneficiaries from the 1934-1942 birth cohorts observed in panel over the period of 1995-2008. Using a regression discontinuity research design, we find evidence of a significant disincentive effect on both extensive and intensive margin measures of labor supply. The effect is strongest among individuals with recent labor force activity and among those who enter the program at younger ages. We find evidence of increased work activity after conversion among individuals in all of the major impairment categories, including those who qualified for the program on the basis of a musculoskeletal or mental impairment.
Institutional Background
The Social Security Disability Insurance Program defines disability as the inability to engage in any Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death, or that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
Individuals with qualifying disabilities are eligible for DI benefits if they are fully insured and have recent work activity.
2 In order to be fully insured, an individual must have accumulated at least one calendar quarter of work 3 in covered employment for every year elapsing since age 22, up to a maximum of 40 quarters.
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DI applications are reviewed in five sequential steps. During the application process, an applicant may not work above the SGA threshold during a five-month waiting period beginning with the first calendar month following the date of disability onset.
Applicants whose disability is determined to either meet codified criteria (known as the Listing of Impairments) or whose assessed residual functional capacities are such that they are unable to perform any job in the national economy given their age, skills, and work experience, are awarded benefits.
The recency requirement requires that at least half of those quarters be earned within the last 10 years. The threshold defining SGA is $1,000 per month in 2010 and increases annually with the cost of living. The SGA threshold is higher for blind beneficiaries ($1,640 per month in 2010).
Once benefits commence, the beneficiary begins his or her Trial Work Period (TWP). The TWP allows the recipient to test his ability to work for at least nine months.
During the TWP, full DI benefits are paid regardless of how high the recipient's earnings are. The TWP continues indefinitely until the recipient accumulates nine months of earnings above a threshold, which is lower than the SGA threshold (currently $720), during a rolling five-year period. These nine months may be nonconsecutive. At the end of the TWP (i.e., once nine months of work above the threshold have been accumulated) 2 Blind workers need only be fully insured; the recency requirement does not apply. 3 The amount of earnings required for a quarter of coverage in 2010 is $1,120; the amount increases annually with the national average wage index. 4 Those who become disabled before age 24 need a minimum of six quarters earned during the past three years. or she retains the full OA benefit, which equals the DI benefit. With no incentive to constrain hours to H SGA , the individual can now increase utility even further (to the pink indifference curve) by increasing hours of work to point H 1 . Hours at point H 1 are less than at the counterfactual point H 0 due to the income effect arising from benefit receipt.
One implication of the theoretical framework presented in Figure 1 is that any labor supply responses at conversion are most likely to occur along the intensive margin, by beneficiaries with pre-conversion earnings near the SGA threshold. Another implication is that since individuals who would work fewer hours in the absence of the program (i.e., those with counterfactual earnings closer to the SGA threshold) are more susceptible to the DI work disincentives-in the sense that they have the most to gain from program participation-these same individuals should be more likely to respond to the relaxation of the work disincentives at conversion compared to those with higher counterfactual earnings.
Data and Summary Statistics
We use administrative Social Security data for the universe of DI primary worker in the calendar year the cohort turns 65 are mostly pre-conversion earnings, earnings at age 66 are roughly half pre-conversion and half post-conversion earnings, and earnings at age 67 are entirely post-conversion earnings. In the analyses that follow, it is important to remember that "earnings at age a" are in fact "annual earnings in the calendar year the cohort attains age a."
The next figures present summary statistics for our data extract of DI beneficiaries. Figure 3 shows the age profile in the mean monthly Primary Insurance Of particular interest are the age profiles of labor supply among DI beneficiaries, unadjusted for covariates. Figure 6 shows the age profile of labor force participation for each birth cohort as the DI population passes through their FRA and converts to the OA program. In this instance, participation is defined as annual earnings above the annualized SGA threshold. Not surprisingly given the DI work rules, in all cohorts labor force participation at age 60 is low, ranging from around 3 to 5 percent.
10
In contrast to the extensive margin, the intensive margin shows a more pronounced response pattern as the cohorts cross the FRA threshold. 
Research Design
To estimate the change in labor supply as DI beneficiaries reach their FRA and convert to the OA program, we fit a series of regression discontinuity models using OLS estimators. As shown in Equation (1) 
The coefficients of interest are 66 β and 67 β , which measure the post-conversion labor supply response relative to a pre-conversion reference age, set to age 64 in the models that follow. The vector of covariates x ica includes controls for sex, education level, impairment category, age at entitlement (to control for program tenure), and PIA (the monthly benefit amount and also a summary of pre-program labor supply).
The identifying assumption in this research design is that other factors affecting labor supply trend smoothly as individuals cross the FRA threshold. As noted above, Medicare coverage continues uninterrupted as most DI beneficiaries convert to OA.
However, a small group of late entrants (those entering DI at age 63 or later) will newly acquire Medicare coverage coincident with conversion. To the extent Medicare coverage does not evolve smoothly through the FRA threshold, we note that the income effect associated with gaining coverage should lead these individuals to reduce their labor supply, therefore biasing down the estimated labor supply response. We address this concern by estimating Equation (1) separately for early and late DI entrants, where early entrants are defined as those who enter the program before 59 and late entrants are those who enter at ages 59 or older. As an additional test of the research design, we estimate models contrasting individuals born in January versus December to show how the labor supply response is deferred by one year for those born nearly one year later.
Finally, since according to our theoretical framework in Figure 1 , any labor supply response is likely to be concentrated among those with recent work activity, we estimate Equation (1) separately for the full population and a subset of individuals with recent work activity, defined as having positive earnings in the prior calendar year (i.e., at a-1). Table 2 shows estimates of Equation (1) for the labor supply outcome of annual earnings (not conditioned on participation) for all cohorts pooled. Equation (1) is estimated separately for four groups: 1) All DI beneficiaries who entered DI before age 59 ("All Beneficiaries, Early Entrants"); 2) All DI beneficiaries who entered DI at age 59 or older ("All Beneficiaries, Late Entrants"); 3) DI beneficiaries with recent work activity who entered DI before age 59 ("Recent Work Activity, Early Entrants"); and 4) DI beneficiaries with recent work activity who entered at age 59 or older ("Recent Work Activity, Late Entrants"). The coefficients of interest are the coefficients on the age dummies, where age 64 is the reference age category. In the models estimated for all beneficiaries, the pattern of age coefficients indicates a steady decline in earnings with age, for both early and late entrants. In contrast, among the beneficiaries with recent work activity, the pattern of age coefficients a steady decline in earnings with age only until age 66, after which, earnings rise sharply. These patterns are most easily grasped by examining the age coefficients graphically. Figure 9 has two panels, one for all beneficiaries and one for those with recent work activity, where each panel shows the implied earnings levels for the early and late entrants (based on the coefficients from each of the models in Table 2 ). Implied earnings levels aid interpretation and are computed by adding mean earnings at age 64 in each sample to each age coefficient. Among those with recent work activity, an abrupt reversal of the downward trend in earnings occurs between ages 66 and 67, when the entire sample has converted to OA. The increase in earnings is apparent for both early and late entrants, and interestingly, is largest for early entrants. The fact that a labor supply response is evident-and even largest-for those who have been on DI longer suggests that the labor supply response is not due to regression to the mean, perhaps driven by a biological recovery effect.
Results
In addition to the age coefficients, Table 2 also presents the coefficients for the other covariates in the model. Of note is the negative coefficient on the male indicator, which implies the counterintuitive result that earnings are lower for male DI beneficiaries compared to female beneficiaries. This coefficient arises because the model controls for PIA; holding PIA (i.e., lifetime earnings) constant, male DI beneficiaries have lower earnings than women. When we drop PIA from the models, the male coefficient reverts to its usual positive sign. Also of note is the pattern of increasing negative coefficients on the cohort dummies (the reference cohort is 1934); these imply higher earnings among earlier cohorts compared to later cohorts as was evident in Figure 7 .
Results for the extensive margin alone are presented in graphic form only, and shown in Figure 10 . Figure 10 has We next test for heterogeneous effects among those with recent work activity, beginning with impairment type. Figure 11 shows the implied earnings levels derived from the age coefficients of Equation (1) estimated separately by impairment type.
Earnings decline for all groups, quite precipitously between ages 64 and 66, then rise abruptly between age 66 and 67 among both early and late entrants. Among early entrants, the percent increase in earnings is largest among those nervous system or sensory impairments, followed by circulatory impairments, respiratory impairments, mental disorders, musculoskeletal impairments and injuries. Among late entrants, the percent increase in earnings after conversion to OA is largest for those with musculoskeletal impairments. The pronounced pre-period drop in the two years before conversion is curious, and could suggest anticipatory behavior. Still, it is not clear if in the absence of impending conversion earnings would have continued to decline-as they do in aggregate for all beneficiaries combined-or if they would have remained at approximately their age 64 levels.
Earlier we noted that one implication of Figure 1 is that DI beneficiaries with lower counterfactual earnings should be more responsive to relaxation of the DI work disincentives at conversion. Although counterfactual earnings are not observed, the individual's Primary Insurance Amount can be thought of as an approximation since it is a function of past earnings, including earnings during the period prior to attaining insured status. Figure 12 shows the results of Equation (1) estimated separately for early and late entrants with recent work activity by high (above median) and low (below median) PIAs.
Earnings rise more in absolute value for beneficiaries with high PIAs, but the effect in percent terms is similar or even larger (early entrants) for those with low PIAs since they have lower pre-period earnings.
Finally, Figure 13 presents a robustness check where we contrast the behavior around conversion for individuals born in January versus December. Individuals born in January of a given calendar year convert nearly a year later than those born in December, and therefore we would expect a similar labor supply response pattern but delayed by one year for those born in December. Indeed, the pre-conversion drop in earnings is noticeably delayed by one year. Among the early entrants, the abrupt increase occurs more rapidly for those born in December and the two birth month groups peak in the same year. However, among the late entrants the peak occurs one year later.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a natural experiment generated by the interaction of the Using a regression discontinuity research design, we find evidence of a significant disincentive effect on both extensive and intensive margin measures of labor supply, primarily among individuals with recent work activity who comprise approximately 12 percent of all DI beneficiaries. The fact that the effect is larger among individuals who enter the program at younger ages (before age 59) than at older ages suggests that it is not the result of regression to the mean, perhaps driven by biological recovery. We find evidence of increased work activity after conversion among individuals in all of the major impairment categories, including those who qualified for the program on the basis of a musculoskeletal or mental impairment. The stronger effects at conversion among those with recent work activity are rationalized in a standard economic framework that predicts effects along the intensive margin of behavior, particularly among individuals whose labor supply was constrained by the program rules.
Our estimates imply that the DI program depresses labor supply among even the oldest DI beneficiaries. To place our estimates in the context of the literature to date that has sought to establish an upper bound on the earnings losses caused by the presence of the DI program by using quasi-experimental variation occurring at the program entry margin, our use of quasi-experimental variation arising from the program exit margin, when individuals are already in their mid-60s and the dominant trend in labor force participation in the population at large is downward, suggests that our estimates are most appropriately viewed as a lower bound estimate of the residual work capacity of all beneficiaries. 
